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I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario is typical. An individual sits amid a pile of
overdue bills. He calculates and recalculates only to verify what he
has already suspected-his debt far exceeds his monthly income.
Meanwhile, creditors and collection agencies demand payment
while threatening repossession and other legal action. With no
ready source of additional income, the debtor ultimately decides to
file for bankruptcy. He consults an attorney, and the two agree to
file a consumer no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.' The law-
yer then promises to use her best efforts to secure relief for the
debtor. All she needs is a retainer.2 A retainer? The debtor has no
money, which is why he sought the counsel of a bankruptcy attor-
ney in the first place. The attorney, however, needs to be paid up
front for the services she renders prior to filing the bankruptcy pe-
tition.3 Otherwise the court will likely discharge4 those fees in the
1. A consumer no-asset Chapter 7 petition is normally filed by a debtor (or debtors) with no
assets available for the trustee to administer for distribution to unsecured creditors. DAVID L.
BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY 111 (1991). The trustee is the individual ap-
pointed in all bankruptcy cases to represent the interests of the debtor's creditors and the bank.
ruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (permitting certain creditors to elect the Chapter
7 trustee); 11 U.S.C. § 704 (setting forth the duties of a Chapter 7 trustee). The bankruptcy
estate is formed upon filing the bankruptcy petition and includes all legal and equitable interests
the debtor retains in any item of property as of the date the petition is filed. MARGARET C.
JASPER, BANKRUPTcY LAW FOR THE INDIMDUAL DEBTOR 86 (1997). All estate assets are either
secured or exempt. BUCHBINDER, supra, at 111. Secured claims relate to those assets that can be
taken over by the creditor in case of debtor default, whereas unsecured claims relate to those
assets for which credit has been extended based solely upon the creditor's assessment of the
debtor's future ability to pay. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 942, 1071 (6th ed. abr. 1991). "Con-
sumer no-asset proceedings compromise a majority of all proceedings filed." BUCHBINDER, supra,
at 111.
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (7th ed. 1999) (a retainer is "a fee paid to a lawyer to se-
cure legal representation").
3. JASPER, supra note 1, at 85 (stating that such services are commonly referred to as "pro-
petition services").
4. Id. at 27. Discharge refers to the process by which the bankruptcy court legally relieves
a debtor of most debts incurred prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. THOMAS H. JAcKSON, THE
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bankruptcy proceedings, and the attorney will not get paid for her
pre-petition work. Dejected, the debtor leaves without an agree-
ment or an attorney, wishing he were wealthy enough to file for
bankruptcy.
Legal counsel is indispensable if a debtor is to effectively file
for bankruptcy.5 The bankruptcy laws are complex, and legal coun-
sel is often crucial in helping the debtor make an informed decision
based on his unique circumstances and the available alternatives.6
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy
debtor can afford to pay a bankruptcy attorney up front.7 This
leaves bankruptcy practitioners in a predicament; without a re-
tainer, prudent counsel will not agree to pay the requisite filing fees
or to perform other necessary pre-petition services because the
debtor's obligations to pay for pre-petition legal services are likely
to be discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.8 This situation
"limit[s] indigent debtors' access to bankruptcy relief and, perhaps,
LOGIC AND LIBITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225 (1986) (Discharge not only releases the debtor from
past financial obligations but also protects him from some of the adverse consequences that
might otherwise result from that release. For these reasons, discharge is viewed as granting the
debtor a financial fresh start."). These debts typically include general credit card debt and medi-
cal and hospital bills, among others. See JASPER, supra note 1, at 27. However, only those debts
enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") and incurred pre-petition qualify for discharge.
11 U.S.C. §§ 523-524 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Upon discharge, the automatic stay provision pro-
hibits creditors from attempting to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994). "If a duly notified creditor takes action to collect on a discharged debt,
the creditor may be held in contempt of court. This is so even if the creditor had previously
obtained a judgment against the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing." JASPER, supra note 1, at
27. Debts incurred post-petition are not dischargeable and will not fall within the automatic
stay provision. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(6), 727 (1994). Consequently, they remain the debtor's re-
sponsibility, and creditors may seek payment for those debts. In re Hines, 147 F.3d 1185, 1191
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding provision of pre-petition legal services dischargeable under § 727).
5. WLLAMI C. HILIMAN, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: WHAT EVERY DEBTOR AID CREDITOR
NEEDS TO KINOW 19-20 (1993) ('[It is generally a mistake and a false economy not to use the
services of a bankruptcy lawyer.... The old saying that people who represent themselves 'have a
fool for a client is particularly true in the bankruptcy court.").
6. Id. at 20 ("The bankruptcy laws can be extraordinarily complicated. Many mistakes
people make by trying to do it on their own often cannot be corrected later. Even the simplest
choices involve uncertainties and risks if you are not thoroughly familiar with the law.").
7. Joshua D. Morse, Comment, Public Policy Is Never a Substitute for Statutory Clarity:
Rejecting the Notion that Pre-Petition Attorney-Fee Debts Are Dischargeable in Chapter 7 Bank-
ruptcies, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 575, 582 (2000) ('Since a debtor's cash flow is likely con-
strained when filing bankruptcy, many debtors struggle to pay their counsel in full pre-
petition.").
8. In re Leitner, 221 B.R 502, 503 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998) (holding that a Chapter 7 dis-
charge relieved debtor of personal obligation to attorney for legal fees); In re Symes, 174 B.R.
114, 119 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) ('Unless section 523 dictates otherwise, every prepetition debt
becomes discharged under section 727.") (citing In re Beezley, 994 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir.
1993)).
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increase[s] the number of pro se bankruptcy debtors,"9 leaving igno-
rant debtors alone to navigate the complex waters of bankruptcy
law.
The Bankruptcy Code fails to properly enable bankruptcy
counsel in a no-asset Chapter 7 proceeding to guarantee payment
for the legal services they render pre-petition. 10 Section 329 of the
Code governs debtors' transactions with attorneys, requiring the
debtor's attorney to file disclosure statements setting forth the
source of her compensation and the amount of fees 'paid or agreed
to be paid ... for services rendered or to be rendered"11 in contem-
plation of the bankruptcy proceeding.12 By its own terms, § 329 ad-
9. In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119, 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
10. See NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. BANKR. BULL., July 1998, at 21. In a Chapter 13
case, an attorney can choose to be paid under the debtor's plan. Id. Under a Chapter 13 plan,
attorney's fees are priority claims entitled to full payment and are conditions of confirmation.
See generally Jonathan L. Flaxer, Getting Paid in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Cases, in HOW TO
HANDLE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES 1999, at 301 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. 792, 1999).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994) (emphasis added).
12. Bankruptcy Rules 2016 and 2017 collectively comprise the "Disclosure Provisions" re-
lating to § 329. GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW ix (1996) C('he
Code itself contains mainly matters of substance; procedure by and large is governed by a sepa-
rate package of Bankruptcy Rules promulgated pursuant to the Supreme Court's rule-making
power."). Rule 2016 specifically requires debtor's counsel to file a disclosure statement identify-
ing fee arrangements paid or agreed to be paid and whether an agreement exists between the
applicant and any other entity for the sharing of compensation received or to be received for
services rendered in connection with the case:
(a) Application for Compensation or Reimbursement. An entity seeking interim
or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary expenses,
from the estate shall file an application setting forth a detailed statement of (1)
the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the
amounts requested. An application for compensation shall include a statement
as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant
for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connec-
tion with the case, the source of compensation so paid or promised, whether any
compensation previously received had been shared and whether an agreement
or understanding exists between the applicant and any other entity for the
sharing of compensation received or to be received for services rendered in con-
nection with the case, and the particulars of any sharing of compensation or
agreement or understanding therefore, except that details of any agreement by
the applicant for the sharing of compensation as a member or regular associate
of a firm of lawyers or accountants shall not be required. The requirements of
this subdivision shall apply to an application for compensation for services ren-
dered by an attorney or accountant even though the application is filed by a
creditor or other entity. Unless the case is a chapter 9 municipality case, the
applicant shall transmit to the United States Trustee a copy of the application.
(b) Disclosure of Compensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor. Every
attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for compensation,
shall file and transmit to the United States Trustee within 15 days after the
order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct, the statement re-
quired by 329 of the Code including whether the attorney has shared or agreed
to share the compensation with any other entity. The statement shall include
the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to share by the attorney, but
2001] BANKRUPTCY, JUST FOR THE RICH? 1669
vocates a discharge exemption for pre-petition attorney's fees; the
phrase "paid or agreed to be paid for services rendered or agreed to
be rendered" authorizes post-petition payment of fees incurred pre-
petition.'
3
In contrast, § 727 of the Code discharges the debtor "from all
debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under this
chapter and any liability on a claim14 ... as if the claim had arisen
before the commencement of the case ... except as provided under
[section] 523." 15 Section 523 governs exceptions to discharge, and it
does not explicitly exempt bankruptcy attorneys' pre-petition fees.
6
the details of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a mem-
ber or regular associate of the attorney's law firm shall not be required. A sup.
plemental statement shall be filed and transmitted to the United States Trus-
tee within 15 days after any payment or agreement not previously disclosed.
FED. IP BANKR. P. 2016.
Rule 2017 details the procedure by which a debtor's payments to his bankruptcy counsel are
reviewed to determine if they are reasonable or excessive:
(a) Payment or Transfer to Attorney Before Order For Relief. On motion by any
party in interest or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and a
hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of prop-
erty by the debtor, made directly or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing
of a petition under the Code by or against the debtor or before entry of the or-
der for relief in an involuntary case, to an attorney for services rendered or to
be rendered is excessive.
(b) Payment of Transfer to Attorney After Order for Relief. On motion by the
debtor, the United States trustee, or on the court's own initiative, the court af-
ter notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any
transfer of property, or any agreement therefor, by the debtor to an attorney af-
ter entry of an order for relief in a case under the Code is excessive, whether
the payment or transfer is made or is to be made directly or indirectly, if the
payment, transfer, or agreement therefore is for services in any way related to
the case.
FED. i. BANKR. P. 2017.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) (1994).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994) (defining claim as "the right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured. unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured); Hessinger & Assocs. v.
United States Tr. (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that nowhere in § 523
is there a provision that excepts debts for attorneys' fees incurred in preparing bankruptcy peti-
tions and that "[a]ll of the debtor's pre-petition debts, save those listed in section 523, are dis-
charged in a Chapter 7 proceeding').
15. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) provides:
Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a)
of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of
the order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is de-
termined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on any such
debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994).
16. Section 523 states:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
(1) for a tax or customs duty...
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Thus, unpaid pre-petition attorneys fees appear to be dischargeable
claims under § 727 and § 523.17
If § 329 were the only provision relevant in determining the
dischargeability of pre-petition legal fees, those fees would be ex-
empted from discharge, unless the court found the fees unreason-
able.' 8 Other Code provisions, however, particularly § 727 and
§ 523, must be considered when determining the dischargeability of
pre-petition legal fees. Unfortunately, § 329 potentially conflicts
with § 727 and § 523. At best, then, the Code creates confusion; at
worst, it houses competing provisions.
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by [fraudulent means];
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in
time to permit [timely filing of a proof of claim];
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzle-
ment, or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, main-
tenance for, or support of such spouse or child... ;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for ac-
tual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty... ;
(8) for an education benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaran-
teed by a governmental unit... ;
(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of motor
vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated
from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance;
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior
case concerning the debtor under this title or under the Bankruptcy Act in
which the debtor waived discharge, or was denied a discharge ... ;
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent order
or decree entered in any court of the United States or of any state, issued
by a Federal depository institution regulatory agency... ;
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the
debtor to a Federal depository institution regulatory agency to maintain
the capital of an insured depository institution ... ;
(13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued under title 18, United
States Code;
(14) incurred to pay a tax to the United Sates that would be nondischarge-
able pursuant to paragraph (1);
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the
debtor in the course of a divorce or separation... ;
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the order
for relief to a [condominium] membership association... ;
(17) for a fee imposed by a court for the filing of a case, motion, complaint,
or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such
filing regardless of an assertion of poverty by the debtor ....
Id.
17. In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 498-99 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (noting that the "broad dis-
charge" under § 727(b) and the "limited exceptions to discharge" in § 523 suggest that pro-
petition attorney fees are dischargeable).
18. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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These conflicting Code provisions have forced courts to in-
terpret and reconcile their inconsistencies. The result has been any-
thing but ideal. In the absence of an express exemption from dis-
charge, most courts have held pre-petition attorney fees discharge-
able. 19 This has forced bankruptcy attorneys to "get creative" if they
wish. to get paid;20 accordingly, they have resorted to a variety of
pre-petition fee arrangements in an effort to sidestep discharge.
21
Unfortunately, the legality of these fee arrangements has varied
among jurisdictions. 22 Moreover, the decisions frequently turn on
fact patterns so unique that predicting the court's decision in a
given case remains a challenge. This uncertainty has led many at-
torneys to refuse to serve as counsel for debtors unable to pay their
pre-petition legal expenses in full and in advance.23 Consequently,
many debtors either file pro se24 or do not file at all-and they con-
tinue to watch their financial problems spiral out of control.
19. See e.g., In re Hines, 147 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502,
503 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998); In re Martin, 197 B.P. 120, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996); Hessinger
& Assocs. v. Voglio (In re Voglio), 191 B.R. 420, 422 (D. Ariz. 1996). But see, e.g., In re Perry, 225
B.I. 497, 500-01 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404, 410 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
The later case of In re Biggar effectively overruled Mills. In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 687.
20. See In re Nieves, 246 BR. 866, 873 (Banlr. E.D. Wis. 2000) (acknowledging that al-
though the absence of an express exemption from discharge for pre-petition legal fees may make
it difficult for debtors to obtain legal counsel, "(there are some ways, short of legislation, which
can be utilized to overcome this obstacleI;]... [t]here may be other creative solutions which will
work [as well]"); In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
21. See infra Part rI; see also, e.g., In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119, 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998)
(acknowledging that attorneys have attempted to bypass caselaw).
22. Compare, e.g., In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 687-88 (opposing the use of installment agree-
ments to secure pre-petition legal fees), with In re Perez, 177 B.IR 319, 321-22 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1995) (permitting the use of installment agreements). Compare, e.g., In re Mahendra, 131 F.3d
750, 759 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that attorney's lien on client's real property constitutes a con-
flict of interest justifying denial of or reduction in attorney compensation), and In re Ragar, 3
F.3d 1174, 1180 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the taking of a pre-petition security interest in
debtor's property creates a conflict of interest, thereby disqualifying the attorney from repre-
senting the debtor), with In re Leitner, 221 BR. 502, 504 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998) (finding that a
debtor's lawyer is not disqualified from representing the debtor simply because he is a secured
creditor).
23. See, e.g., Posting of 0. Max Gardner Il, omaxiijshelby.net, to www.abiworld.org (Aug.
29, 1999) ("I have never filed a Chapter 07 case until the full amount of the agreed fee has been
paid.") (responding to James P. Caher, Visa-It's Eterywhere You Want to Be. How About Bank-
ruptcy Court?, available at www.abiworld.org/newsletl99caher625.html (June 25, 1999) (copy on
file with author)); Posting of Julie Stodolka, jfs349@aoLcom, to www.abiworld.org (Aug. 31, 1999)
("And the risk of non-payment is quite real-Debtors have money problems, and their lawyers
are well-advised to be paid up front.") (responding to Caher, supra).
24. BLACKs LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (7th ed. 1999) (defining pro so as "one who represents
oneself in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer"). Debtors filed pro se in 555 of
the Chapter 7 cases analyzed in an ongoing study at Creighton University School of Law.
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela I. White, Reaffirmation and Discharge Problems in Consumer
Financial Services Litigation 1999, at 703, 722 n.18 (PLI Corp. Litig. Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. 1114, 1999).
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This Note addresses and responds to the confusion caused by
the effects of the conflicting Code provisions. It proposes that Con-
gress amend § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code to include pre-petition
debtor's attorney's fees in the list of items exempted from
discharge. 25 Such an express provision would render costly litiga-
tion of this issue moot,26 thereby allowing bankruptcy attorneys to
concentrate more directly on their clients' needs. It would also pre-
empt many of the conflict of interests challenges that arise under
some of the more popular non-guaranteed fee arrangements. 27 Fur-
thermore, an exemption for pre-petition legal fees would encourage
counsel to represent even the poorest of debtors by removing the
risks associated with representation of those who might be unable
to pay their pre-petition legal expenses in full and in advance. Un-
der such an exemption, attorneys would be allowed to structure fee
agreements that enable debtors to pay their pre-petition legal fees
post-petition. Increased availability of representation would provide
more debtors with access to the bankruptcy system, affording them
more effective advice and enabling them to make informed financial
decisions.28 Ultimately, this would maximize debtor wealth by re-
ducing the threat of creditor collection and granting debtors a fi-
nancial fresh-start.29
Part II of this Note discusses the four most popular fee ar-
rangements currently employed by attorneys attempting to circum-
vent the discharge of their pre-petition services. Part III scrutinizes
these four fee arrangements, highlighting the shortcomings of each.
The Note concludes in Part IV by calling on Congress to address the
concerns and confusion that have echoed throughout bankruptcy
courts. It recommends that Congress amend § 523 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to exempt unpaid, pre-petition bankruptcy attorney's
25. In March 2001, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act which President George W.
Bush is expected to sign. The Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Consumer Protection Act of
2001 (H.R. 333); The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (S. 420). The new legislation did not ad-
dress the indigent debtors' difficulties accessing the bankruptcy system, nor did it add pro-
petition debtors attorney's fees to the list of those items exempt from discharge under Section
523. To the contrary, the legislation is much more pro-creditor, making it very difficult for debt-
ors to file bankruptcy, particularly Chapter 7. Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays
Dividend, N.Y. TiMES, March 13, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/13/poli.
tics/13LOBB.html?searchpv=siteO9.
26. In re Hines, 147 F.3d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that because the stakes in any
individual Chapter 7 case tend to be so low in relation to the cost of litigating the dischargeabil-
ity of attorneys' fees, any controversy that does arise rarely finds its way to the courts).
27. For a discussion of this conflict of interest, see infra Part III.A.1 and Part IlI.C.
28. See David A. Lander, Essay, A Snapshot of Two Systems That Are Trying to Help People
in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 163 (1999).
29. Caher, supra note 23.
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fees from discharge, thereby opening the doors of the bankruptcy
system to even the poorest of debtors.
II. FouR PRIMARY FEE AGREEMENTS FOR PRE-PETITION
LEGAL SERVICES IN A No-ASSET CHAPTER 7 PROCEEDING
A. Reaffirmation of Debt Incurred Pre-petition
1. Historical Background
Reaffirmation is an agreement in which a debtor promises to
continue payments on debts incurred pre-petition until such debts
have been paid in full. 30 "The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867,
and 1898 did not contain any provisions limiting or prohibiting the
reaffirmation of dischargeable debts. Reaffirmation agreements
were matters solely between the debtor and the creditor,"3 1 and
they were left to the realm of general contract law.32 The absence of
regulation led to widespread abuse by creditors, who frequently co-
erced debtors into paying their debts.33 In recognition of such abuse,
the 1971 Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States4
drafted legislation disallowing reaffirmation agreements except
those assuming the form of redemption agreements35 or those made
to settle dischargeability litigation.36 Congress at first rejected this
prohibitive proposal, but eventually it took heed of the dangers
posed by reaffirmation. Ultimately, in 1978, Congress drafted a new
30. JASPER, supra note 1, at 16.
31. ROBERT A. HESSLING, REAFFIRMATION AND REDEMPTION 139 (1994).
32. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 49 (1992); Marianne B. Culhane &
Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge" An Empirical Study of Reaf/irmation, 73 AI. BANKR.
L.J. 709, 715 (1999).
33. HESSLING, supra note 31, at 24; Culhane & White, supra note 32, at 715.
34. HESsLING, supra note 31, at 42. Members of the commission were appointed by the
President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and members of Congress. The Commission
began its study in 1971, ultimately presenting its results to Congress on July 30, 1973. Id.
35. Redemption agreements give a Chapter 7 consumer debtor the right to pay a lump sum
to a secured creditor for the amount equal to the value of any collateral. A court may need to
hold a valuation hearing to determine the adequacy of the redemption amount. Section 722 of
the Bankruptcy Code permits redemption agreements. Id. at 604.
36. In 1973, the Bankruptcy Commission warned Congress that: "Substantial evidence of
the use of reaffirmations to nullify discharges has come to the Commission's attention. To the
extent that reaffirmations are enforceable, the 'fresh start' goal of the discharge ... is frustrated.
Reaffirmations are often obtained by improper methods.. . H.R. IREP. No. 95-595, at 116
(1977). The commission also recommended that "reaffirmations of unsecured debts be unen-
forceable and that reaffirmations of secured debts be enforceable only to the extent of the fair
market value of the collateral as of the date of the petitionf HESSLING, supra note 31, at 140.
2001] 1673
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Bankruptcy Act which required a court determination that reaf-
firmation agreements did not impose undue hardships upon debtors
and that they served debtors' best interests.3 7 As further protection,
the 1978 Code allowed debtors to rescind reaffirmation agreements
up to thirty days after they became effective. 38 These strict provi-
sions reflected congressional distrust of reaffirmations and "a desire
to provide debtors with protection that did not exist under the
Bankruptcy Act" of 1898.39
In 1984, Congress further revised the Code's reaffirmation
provisions, implementing more demanding requirements. Congress
intended these amendments to remind debtors of the voluntary na-
ture of reaffirmation agreements and to inform them of their right
to discharge certain debts under the Bankruptcy Code. 40 The
amendments extended the rescission period from thirty to sixty
days,41 mandated discharge hearings, 42 required court approval of
reaffirmations where the debtor was not represented by counsel
during negotiations or throughout the bankruptcy process, 43 and
directed not only that reaffirmation agreements inform debtors of
the voluntary nature of such agreements, but also that they present
such information in a clear and conspicuous statement.44
2. Reasons for Reaffirming
A close look at reaffirmation reveals a variety of reasons why
debtors choose to reaffirm debts. With respect to unsecured debts,
reaffirmation typically provides little or no benefit to the debtor
because the debtor receives no new consideration for the promise to
repay, and the unsecured creditor has no right to penalize the
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) (1994); BAIRD, supra note 32, at 49; Culhane & White, supra
note 32, at 715.
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4); S. REP. No. 65, at 59-60 (1983) (noting that reaffirmation
agreements become effective immediately upon their filing with the court, subject to the court's
review); BAIRD, supra note 32, at 50.
39. " HESSLING, supra note 31, at 141; see also In re Smurzynski, 72 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987) (noting that the strict limitations the 1978 Code placed on reaffirmation agree-
ments reflected an effort "to prevent the debtor from being coerced into signing the agreement
and to enable the debtor to be fully aware of its contents").
40. H.R. REP. No. 835, at 37 (1994).
41. HESSLING, supra note 31, at 141.
42. Id. at 143-44.
43. Id. at 141.
44. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 103(a), 108 Stat. 4108
(1994).
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debtor for defaulting by repossessing his property.45 A debtor with a
special relationship with her creditor, however, may feel a moral
obligation to reaffirm.46 For example, the creditor may be a relative
or a friend of the debtor, thus creating even greater responsibility
to reaffirm.47 The debtor could also choose to reaffirm in order to
protect the loan guarantor or co-signer; if the debt is discharged,
the creditor may attempt to collect the debt from the non-
discharging party, thereby forcing the remaining guarantor to bear
the entire financial burden.48 Alternatively, the need for additional
credit or loans may also cause a debtor to reaffirm an existing
debt.49 By discharging all debts, the bankruptcy court relieves the
debtor of his obligation to repay them. Declaring bankruptcy, how-
ever, may prevent the debtor from obtaining future credit. To avoid
such a negative outcome, the debtor may wish to reaffirm.50
With respect to secured debts, a debtor may seek to reaffirm
in order to prevent repossession or foreclosure of property, such as
a home, a car, or furniture. A secured creditor may be willing to
forego repossession of the property, but only if the debtor reaffirms
the debt.51 The cost of replacing such items may be so extraordinary
that reaffirmation may be more financially advantageous than dis-
charge. 52 Moreover, retention of such property is often essential if
45. MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 230 (1995) CIt is generally be-
lieved that reaffirmations are rarely appropriate for anything other than secured debt. Seldom
will the debtor receive benefits from paying an unsecured claim that are in any way equivalent
to the cost of the payments."); see also Culhane & White, supra note 24, at 711; Karen Gross, As
We Fleece Our Debtors, 102 DICK. L. REv. 747, 748 (1998) (citing the Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission's 1997 Final Report which detailed concerns about the number of debtors reaffirming
their debts and recommended absolute elimination of unsecured reaffirmation agreements).
46. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed
Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AL BANKR. INST. L REV. 165, 191 (1997)
CA discharge from a legal obligation does not necessarily mean a discharge from a moral obliga-
tion, and debtors may feel guilty about getting a discharge.").
47. BAIRD, supra note 32, at 49.
48. Sheldon Barasch, Reaffirmation, in HOW TO HANDLE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CASES
1999, at 235, 237 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 792, 1999). If a debtor
files for bankruptcy and lists a debt for which he has a co.signer, that co-signer will be held re-
sponsible for that debt after the debtor is discharged, even if the co-signer never received the
underlying consideration. Therefore, the debtor may wish to reaffirm the debt to protect the co-
signer. Id.
49. HESSLING, supra note 31, at 142; see also Culhane & White, supra note 24, at 711.
50. See Barasch, supra note 48, at 238.
51. See BAIRD, supra note 32, at 49.
52. See id. For example, a debtor may be unable to purchase a new car after he files a no-
asset Chapter 7 claim due to his poor credit. It may be in his best interest to reaffirm the debt
and continue paying his creditor in order to keep his car. Id.
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the debtor is to gain a "fresh start"58 following the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 5
4
3. Practical Application Today
In a typical no-asset Chapter 7 proceeding, the judge dis-
charges all debts in accordance with the discharge requirements set
forth in § 727 and § 523. 55 Dischargeable debts generally include
credit card debt 56 and medical and hospital bills, but they can also
include attorneys' fees incurred prior to filing the bankruptcy peti-
tion.5
7
The Code permits the debtor to voluntarily agree to repay a
particular debt. 58 No new legal obligation is created if the reaf-
firmation does not comply with the requirements set forth in
§ 524(c) and § 524(d);59 the creditor will have no remedy against the
debtor under contract law because no new consideration is offered,
nor will he find a remedy under bankruptcy law because the agree-
ment does not comport with the Code's requirements. The debtor
creates a legally enforceable obligation, however, if he complies
with the Bankruptcy Code's provisions and obtains court approval
of a reaffirmation agreement.
60
Legal reaffirmation is one approach attorneys often take to
guarantee payment of services rendered pre-petition. Typically, the
situation arises when the debtor informs his attorney that he can-
not provide her with a retainer to pay for work performed pre-
petition. The attorney, still wishing to represent the debtor in the
bankruptcy proceeding, suggests that the debtor reaffirm his debt
53. See HERBERT, supra note 45, at 3 C'[B]ankruptcy is seen as a financial rebirth; after the
'estate'.. . is administered, and the debts discharged, the debtor begins a new financial life,
unencumbered by the debts of the old."); Hessling, supra note 31, at 142.
54. Culhane & White, supra note 24, at 711. But see Gross, supra note 45, at 758 (citing the
Bankruptcy Review Commission's 1997 Final Report which recommended the elimation of so-
cured reaffirmation agreements where the value of the collateral secured is under $500).
55. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004, 4007 (allow-
ing a trustee or creditor to file a complaint and claim that there are reasons for denying dis-
charge). If no objecting complaints are filed, the court must issue a discharge order upon expira-
tion of the sixty days following the § 341 meeting. Id. See also JASPER, supra note 1, at 27.
56. The Code specifically refuses to discharge credit card debt if the debtor incurred that
debt with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the credit card company. 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also HILLMAN, supra note 5, at 81.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994); JASPER, supra note 1, at 27.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d).
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by agreeing to continue payments until the debt has been paid in
full. To ensure the legal enforceability of such an agreement, the
debtor must adhere to the provisions of § 524(c)6 1 and § 524(d)62 of
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) provides:
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration
for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case
under this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if-
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under
section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title;
(2)
(A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which
advises the debtor that the agreement is filed with the court, which-
ever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such
claim; and
(B) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which
advises the debtor that such agreement is not required under this ti-
tle, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any agreement not in accor-
dance with the provisions of this subsection;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable, accom-
panied by a declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that represented the
debtor during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsec-
tion, which states that-
(A) such agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agree-
ment by the debtor;
(B) such agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor; and
(C) the attorney fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and conse-
quences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in this subsection; and
(ii) any default under such an agreement;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to dis-
charge or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court,
whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such
claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with;
and
(6)
(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an
attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this
subsection, the court approves such an agreement as-
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a
consumer debt secured by real property.
11 U.s.c. § 524(c).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) provides:
In a case concerning an individual, when the court has determined whether to
grant or not to grant a discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this
title, the court may hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person.
At any such hearing, the court shall inform the debtor that a discharge has
been granted or the reason why a discharge has not been granted. If a dis-
charge has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an arrangement of
the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section and was not represented by
an attorney during the course of negotiating such agreement, then the court
shall hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person and at such
hearing the court shall-
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the Code. Under these provisions, the debtor must file a written
reaffirmation agreement with the court prior to entry of the
debtor's discharge. 63 The agreement must contain a "clear and con-
spicuous statement" advising the debtor that he may rescind the
reaffirmation at any time prior to receiving a discharge, or sixty
days after the agreement is filed, whichever comes later.6 Equally
critical is the attorney's responsibility to file a declaration or affi-
davit representing that the debtor's agreement is knowing and vol-
untary and that it complies with the Code. 65 The court then holds a
hearing to determine whether the relevant Code provisions have
been satisfied, and whether the debtor understands that the reaf-
firmation agreement is a voluntary one.66 If the court approves the
reaffirmation agreement, the legal obligation to pay the debt re-
mains unless the debtor rescinds the agreement prior to discharge
or within sixty days of court approval.67
B. Characterization As Post-Petition Fees
Agreements allowing pre-petition fees to be paid post-
petition are the second type of fee arrangements employed by bank-
ruptcy attorneys in order to evade the Code's discharge provisions.
If a bankruptcy attorney permits post-petition payment, she typi-
cally structures the fee agreement in one of three ways.
(1) Inform the debtor-
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this title, under non-
bankruptcy law, or under any agreement not made in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (c) of this section; and
(B) of the legal effect and consequences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section;
and
(ii) a default under such an agreement; and
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor desires to make complies
with the requirements of subsection (c)(6) of this section, if the consideration
for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt that is not
secured by real property of the debtor.
11 U.s.c. § 524(d).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1); BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 125.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2); BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 125.
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3); BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 125.
66. See, e.g., In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119, 123 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In re Perez, 177 B.R.
319, 321-22 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
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1. Post-Dated Checks
The first of these methods involves the use of post-dated
checks.68 In this type of fee arrangement, the debtor presents the
attorney with post-dated checks before the attorney files the bank-
ruptcy petition.69 This method recasts pre-petition legal fees as
having been incurred post-petition;70 it is intended to give the im-
pression that the debtor is paying the attorney for work performed
post-petition-a debt which is non-dischargeable under the Code.71
Despite the risk that post-dated checks might eventually bounce,
they nonetheless provide the attorney with some hope of collecting
a debt that would otherwise be discharged in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.72 More importantly, post-dated checks enable the debtor to
secure the legal advice and representation he might otherwise be
forced to go without. Furthermore, post-dated checks allow the
debtor to spread out payment of his legal fees over time, thereby
eliminating the financial burden of a single, lump-sum payment.
73
2. Installment Contracts
The installment contract is another popular fee arrangement
that artificially characterizes pre-petition fees as having been in-
curred post-petition.74 Installment contracts are akin to post-dated
checks in that they allow for payment of attorney's fees over a pe-
riod of time following the bankruptcy filing.75 The primary differ-
68. E.g., In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a debt to at-
torney for pre-petition services is subject to discharge); In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114, 114 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1994) (holding that pre-petition fee agreements requiring debtors to execute post-dated
checks to be cashed post-petition, or requiring execution of pre-petition promissory notes to be
collected post-petition, constitute dischargeable claims).
69. See In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. at 126 (requiring debtor's counsel to disclose whether he had
requested or received any promissory notes or post-dated checks).
70. See In re Symes, 174 B.R. at 118 (debtor's counsel arguing that when payment is sup-
posed to occur by post-dated checks, the claim, if any, arises when the checks are not honored).
71. Caher, supra note 23.
72. See, eg., In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. at 126 n2 (noting that use of post-dated checks was a
common business practice for debtor's counsel).
73. See id. (debtor executed four separate checks, each in the amount of $250.00, to be
cashed every two weeks so as to ease the burden of paying $1,000 in attorney's fees).
74. See, e.g., Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 686
(9th Cir. 1997); Hessinger & Assocs. v. Voglio (In re Voglio), 191 B.R. 420, 421 (D. Ariz. 1996); In
re Perez, 177 B.R. 319, 320 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
75. See In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 827 (describing an installment arrangement which pro-
vided that the debtor would pay for pre-petition services in monthly installments after the attor-
ney filed the bankruptcy petition).
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ence lies in the varying means and timing of these payments. Post-
dated checks are written and given to the attorney prior to accep-
tance of the debtor's case. They will subsequently be cashed in ac-
cordance with the dates on the checks, leaving the debtor no further
control over payment.7 6 In contrast, an installment contract is
signed pre-petition, but it does not require the debtor to immedi-
ately convey the negotiable instrument; thus the debtor retains
more control over the timing of his payments.
77
3. Skeletal Cases
A third popular fee agreement disguising pre-petition legal
fees as post-petition fees is commonly referred to as the skeletal
case agreement.78 Here, the debtor agrees to advance the attorney a
nominal fee,79 in return for which the attorney agrees to perform
the minimal pre-petition work required in order to file a bankruptcy
petition; the bulk of the legal work will then be completed post-
petition. 80 Deferring work in this way allows the attorney to side-
step the threat of discharge; fees incurred for work performed post-
petition are not subject to discharge under bankruptcy law.81 This
benefits both the debtor and attorney in much the same manner as
do post-dated checks and installment contracts.
C. Pre-Petition Security Interests
A pre-petition security interest is another popular fee ar-
rangement. Here, the debtor grants his attorney a security interest
in an item of his property to secure a promissory note executed in
76. This statement assumes that the debtor's bank account will retain funds sufficient to
cover such checks when cashed.
77. Some debtors may find this payment method preferable to immediate conveyance be.
cause in certain months the debtor may have funds insufficient to pay for anything beyond the
bare necessities. If the lawyer cashes a payment check that month, the debtor and his family
may find themselves in dire financial straits. In contrast, using an installment contract allows
the debtor a degree of leverage to renegotiate that month's payment with his attorney before the
money comes out of his bank account.
78. See, e.g., In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 442 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (noting that the debtor's
attorney employed this fee arrangement so as to avoid discharge); Caher, supra note 23.
79. See, e.g. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. at 444 (noting that debtors must pay for all pre.potition
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favor of his attorney.8 2 To satisfy his obligations under the note, the
debtor makes installment payments to the attorney.8 3 As a secured
creditor, the attorney may foreclose on the lien in the event of de-
fault.84 In consideration for the promissory note, the attorney typi-
cally agrees to represent the debtor in all aspects of his Chapter 7
case.8 5
Security interests are attractive to bankruptcy attorneys for
several reasons. First, the security interest provides an added in-
centive to debtors to pay off their debt; if they wish to keep their
property, repayment of the debt will become a priority.8 Second, if
the debtor defaults on the note, the security interest provides the
attorney with a form of collateral compensation.87 Third, the attor-
ney's status as a secured creditor allows the lien to pass through
bankruptcy;88 it remains enforceable as long as the property is ex-
empt under bankruptcy law89 and a Rule 201690 statement discloses
the details of the agreement.91
D. Credit Cards
Using a credit card to pay pre-petition attorney fees is the
latest type of fee arrangement to which attorneys have resorted.9
2
Access to a credit card typically affords a debtor two options: (1) to
take out a cash advance to pay the attorney's pre-petition fees; or
(2) to use the credit card for direct payment to the attorney.
Because this payment method is so new, there are neither
precedent cases nor Code provisions specifically addressing its le-
gality or its impact on dischargeability; and the few cases that do
speak to the issue do little to fashion an appropriate standard.
Much can be inferred from the caselaw governing everyday credit
card transactions conducted by debtors just prior to filing for bank-
82. See, e.g., In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998); In re Perez, 177 BI.R
319, 320 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); see also JASPER, supra note 1, at 13.
83. See, eg., In re Leitner, 221 B.R at 503.
84. U.C.C. § 9-502 (2000); U.C.C. § 9-601 (effective July 1, 2001); HERBERT, supra note 45,
at 27 CM[The key feature of this property interest outside of bankruptcy is that the secured party
may seize and sell the property when the debtor defaults.").
85. See, e.g., In re Leitner, 221 B.R. at 503; In re Perez, 177 B.R. at 319.
86. See supra note 84.
87. BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 361.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1994).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994) (setting forth property exempted under bankruptcy law).
90. See supra note 12 (quoting Rule 2016).
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999); JASPER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
92. See, e.g., In re Frazier, 231 B.R. 454, 455 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999); Citibank (South Da-
kota) v. Meeks (In re Meeks), 139 B.IL 559, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
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ruptcy. Here, courts generally have found the Code's fraud-related
provisions relevant and applicable; 93 specifically, they have held
§ 523(a)(2)(A)9 4 to be the most relevant provision. This section
states that an individual shall not be discharged from any debt "for
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false represen-
tation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition."95 According to the Code,
courts should presume that the debt is nondischargeable if the
debtor acquired luxury goods or services, or obtained a cash ad-
vance under an open end credit plan, within sixty days of filing
bankruptcy. 96 When this is the case, the debtor has the burden of
rebutting the presumption of fraud if he wishes to discharge the
debt.97 This approach has provided a preliminary analytical blue-
print for the few courts considering the legality and dischargeabil-
ity of credit card payment for a bankruptcy attorney's pre-petition
legal fees. 98
93. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Sparks (In re Sparks), 154 B.R. 766, 768 (N.D. Ala.
1993); In re Meeks, 139 B.R. at 559.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. V 1999).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)(A) (1994).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C); H.R. REP. No. 103-834, at 40 (1994).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 103-834, at 40 (1994).
98. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d
1122, 1125-26 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Dougherty factors as set forth In re Dougherty,
84 B.R. 653 (9th Cir. BAP 1988)). The Dougherty factors are:
1) The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2) Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of
bankruptcy before the charges were made;
3) The number of charges made;
4) The amount of the charges;
5) The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges were made;
6) Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;
7) Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
8) Whether or not the debtor was employed;
9) The debtor's prospects for employment;
10) Financial sophistication of the debtor;
11) Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits; and
12) Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.
In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. at 657.
The court also noted that none of these factors are dispositive; courts may simply use them to
determine if the debtor had an overall fraudulent intent. Hashemi, 104 F.3d at 1125; see In re
Sparks, 154 B.R. at 769 (finding the debtor liable for fraudulently incurring debts, based on a
determination that the debtor should have known that he had no ability to repay the debts he
continued to incur because of his slight income and certain court judgements entered against
him).
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III. INADEQUACIES OF THE POPULAR PAYmENT AGREEMENTS
A. Reaffirmation
Of the four payment arrangements discussed in this Note,
reaffirmation is currently the most accepted means by which attor-
neys can avoid a court-ordered discharge of their pre-petition fees.99
This is largely because the Code explicitly permits debtors to enter
into reaffirmation agreements, provided that the attorney and
debtor adhere to the requirements set forth in § 524(c) and § 524(d)
of the Code. 100 Attorneys find reaffirmation agreements desirable
because they are legally enforceable as long as the requirements of
§ 524(c) and § 524(d) are met. 10' Debtors also find reaffirmation
agreements beneficial because they allow the debtor to meet his
moral obligation to repay his debt.10 2 Satisfaction of this obligation
creates an incentive for the debtor's attorney to provide sound legal
advice and to adequately handle the bankruptcy proceeding. Yet,
despite the benefits it provides to both attorneys and debtors, and
although it appears to be the most effective means currently em-
ployed to avoid discharge, reaffirmation by no means guarantees
payment for pre-petition legal services.
1. Court Approval Required
The first problem with reaffirmation agreements between a
debtor and his bankruptcy attorney is that their enforceability is
conditioned upon court approval. 03 Such approval is required be-
cause the attorney is a party to the agreement; representation in
pursuit thereof thus creates an unacceptable conflict of interest. 104
Procuring court approval of reaffirmation agreements therefore,
proves much more onerous than one might initially expect.105 In
99. See In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119, 123 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (noting that a reaffirmation
agreement is a viable solution to the problem created by deeming unpaid pre-petition legal fees
dischargeable); In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 524(d) (1994); In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319, 321-22 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1995).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c); In re Perez, 177 B.I& at 322.
102. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 123.
103. See In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
104. See In re PASCO, 220 B.R. at 123 (citing In re Perez 117 B.1L at 322); Hessinger & As-
socs. v. Voglio (In re Voglio), 191 B.&. 420, 425 (D. Ariz. 1996).
105. In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000) (noting that these reaffirmation
agreements may lead to conflict of interest problems which "may w;'eU necessitate the debtor
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most cases, the inherent conflict of interest obligates the court to
employ heightened scrutiny before issuing its approval. 106
This enhanced judicial scrutiny is employed during the ac-
tual reaffirmation hearing. In this proceeding the court considers
the debtor to be without legal representation.1 0 7 The Code requires
the court to inform the debtor that the Code does not require a reaf-
firmation agreement. 08 In addition, the court must make certain
that the debtor understands the legal and financial ramifications of
entering into such an agreement. 10 9 Most importantly, the court
must determine whether reaffirmation imposes an undue hardship
upon the debtor and whether the agreement serves the debtor's best
interest."0
Demonstrating both a lack of hardship and that reaffirma-
tion is in the debtor's best interest is the greatest challenge for
bankruptcy attorneys in the reaffirmation hearing."' If the reaf-
firmation agreement places no restrictions on the debtor's statutory
right to rescind, the court typically will not find undue hardship. 112
"A more difficult question, [however,] is whether the reaffirmation
is in the 'best interest' of the debtors as required by
§ 524(c)(6)(A)(ii)." 3 Arguably, it is never in the best interest of a
bankruptcy debtor to reaffirm any unsecured pre-petition debt, in-
cluding attorney's fees, because the debtor can always repay any
pre-petition debt without a reaffirmation agreement." 4 Moreover,
by the time a reaffirmation hearing is held, the debtor is likely to
have already received the legal assistance he needed. 115 Thus, it is
obtaining independent counsel in connection with ... the agreement .... [and] would involve
additional expenses which the debtor may not be able to pay").
106. See In re PASCO, 220 B.R. at 123 (quoting In re Perez, 177 B.R. at 321-22). The Codo
does not subject a reaffirmation agreement to heightened scrutiny if the debtor is represented by
independent counsel during the reaffirmation negotiations. See id. at 123 n.7.
107. See id. at 123.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d)(1)(A) (1994); In re PASCO, 220 B.R. at 123.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d)(2)(B); In rePASCO, 220 B.R. at 123.
110. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)(6), 524(d)(2); In re PASCO, 220 B.R. at 123.
111. See In re PASCO, 220 B.R. at 123 n.7.
112. See In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581, 584 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998); In re Perez, 177 B.R. at 319.
113. In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. at 584; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A)(ii):
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attor-
ney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the
court approves such agreement as ... (ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
114. In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. at 584 C'It may be reasonable and necessary for rehabilitation for
a bankruptcy debtor to reaffirm a secured debt in order for the debtor to retain collateral. In the
instance of an unsecured debt, it is not so clear that the debtor will receive any benefit from such
reaffirmation.").
115. Caher, supra note 23; see, e.g., In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998)
(finding that the attorney rendered nearly all necessary legal services prior to the filing of the
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difficult to see why reaffirming a debt for services already rendered
would be in the debtor's best interest." 6 Perhaps most troubling is
that, in general, the attorney has a responsibility to discourage re-
affirmation of unsecured debts, including attorney fees.1 17
The use of reaffirmation agreements to secure payment of
pre-petition legal fees results in significant detriment to the debtor
and provides no new benefit or consideration in exchange thereof.
In one breath the attorney advises the debtor not to reaffirm unse-
cured pre-petition debts due to the lack of financial benefits, yet in
the next breath she asks the debtor to reaffirm her own pre-petition
fee. 118 This is precisely why determination of whether a reaffirma-
tion agreement serves the best interest of the debtor is left to the
discretion of the court; and it is precisely why approval is anything
but a certainty.119
2. Debtor's Right to Rescind
The second major problem with reaffirmation agreements
involves the debtor's right to rescind the agreement even after se-
curing court approval. 120 Under § 524(c)(4), 121 the debtor retains the
right to rescind "at any time prior to discharge or within sixty days
after such agreement is filed," whichever comes later, by sending
notice of the rescission to the claim holder. 122 This provision effec-
tively negates the certainty of payment that one might expect fol-
lowing a court-approved reaffirmation agreement; rather than pro-
viding attorneys with a means of ensuring payment of pre-petition
fees, § 524(c)(4) serves as a last-second parachute for the indecisive
debtor.
bankruptcy petition); In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (i.Tlhis court is of
the opinion that most of the time spent by attorneys and paralegals in Chapter 7 cases is spent
pre-petition."); see also Flaxer, supra note 10, at 307-09 (listing the legal services typically cov-
ered by the initial fee).
116. Caher, supra note 23. But see Caher, supra note 23 (noting that the Nidiher court based
its reasoning on the questionable assumption that the lawyer would be permitted to withdraw if
the debtor refused to affirm); cf. In re Nidiver, 217 B.I. at 584 (finding that reaffirmation was in
the debtor's best interest because the debtor still needed a lawyer, and reaffirmation ensured
continued representation during the remainder of his bankruptcy proceeding).
117. See In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. at 584.
118. See In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (noting the 'serious conflict of
interest" reaffirmation agreements place on the attorney-debtor relationship).
119. See id.
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1994).
121. See id.
122. See id.; In re Perry, 225 B.R. at 498.
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The flexibility of the rescission option allows for a spectrum
of potential debtor reactions. At one extreme stands the debtor who
reaffirms his pre-petition legal expenses, and eventually repays the
debt, without ever invoking the Code's rescission provision. At the
other extreme stands the well-intentioned debtor who reflects upon
the judge's reaffirmation admonitions following the approval hear-
ing. After assessing his financial situation, the debtor realizes that
reaffirmation will lead to serious financial hardship and that he
never should have agreed to reaffirm his pre-petition legal ex-
penses. 123 Section 524(c)(4) grants the debtor the option to extricate
himself from the reaffirmation agreement with no legal conse-
quences. 124 Moreover, this provision also aids the bad faith debtor
who, from the outset, intended to comply with the reaffirmation
agreement until just prior to the expiration of the rescission period,
ultimately leaving the attorney with no compensation for her valu-
able legal services. 25 Even worse, some courts still require the at-
torney to represent a rescinding debtor for the duration of the
bankruptcy proceeding.1
26
Despite the radical differences in these possible scenarios,
one thing remains certain: until the debtor rescinds the agreement
or allows the rescission period to expire, the bankruptcy attorney
continues to provide pre-petition services with no guarantee that
the debtor will adhere to the reaffirmation agreement. The uncer-
tainty created by the rescission provision may therefore deter at-
torneys from representing poor debtors; rather than rely on the
debtor's quasi-guarantee to fulfill his payment obligation, some at-
torneys may choose to avoid representation altogether. 21 By no
means, then, does reaffirmation constitute the guaranteed fee ar-
rangement most attorneys desire.
123. See In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2)(A); In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119,
124 n.8 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
125. Caher, supra note 23.
126. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 120 B.R. 751, 752-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying application
by the debtor's attorney for withdrawal after attorney had been paid a $1,500 retainer and
debtor did not pay for additional legal representation at a discharge objection); see also Caher,
supra note 23. But see, e.g., Arnold M Quittner, Employment and Compensation of Appointed
Professionals, in 18TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
1996, at 297, 480-81 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 737, 1996) (noting
that counsel may have a basis for withdrawal if the client has intentionally disregarded fee ar-
rangements, been uncooperative, or breached the attorney's trust).
127. See In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (noting the "heavy burden" re-
affirmation agreements place on counsel); Hessinger & Assocs. v. Voglio (In re Voglio), 191 B.R.
420, 425 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996) C'[The attorney who does not want to deal with uncertainty may
be deterred from representing clients who cannot afford to pay attorney's fees pre-petition.").
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B. Pre-Petition Agreements for Post-Petition Payment of Fees
1. Post-Dated Checks
The use of post-dated checks is effective as long as the
debtor's checks clear and no one challenges the fee arrangement in
court. If this fee arrangement becomes the subject of litigation,
however, current caselaw suggests that the debtor's attorney should
have an alternate plan.
In re Symes provides one example of judicial disdain for the
use of post-dated checks to pay pre-petition legal fees.128 In this
case, an estate trustee challenged certain bankruptcy attorneys'
practice of requiring clients to execute post-dated checks to be
cashed by the attorney after filing for bankruptcy.12 9 The trustee
claimed that this fee agreement represented a dischargeable pre-
petition debt subject to the automatic stay provision.1 30 In response,
the attorneys argued that these pre-petition retainer agreements
did not constitute dischargeable pre-petition debt; therefore, they
did not violate the Code's automatic stay provision. 131 The court
ruled against the attorneys, holding that retainer agreements in-
volving the acceptance of post-dated checks are dischargeable pre-
petition debts.132 The court based its conclusion on the fact that the
right to payment arises when the debtor and the attorneys execute
a post-dated check retainer-not when the attorneys actually cash
those checks. 133 Because the debtor and attorneys had executed the
agreement pre-petition, the court found the fee arrangements dis-
chargeable as non-exempt pre-petition debt.'3 4
The court in In re Jastrem135 rendered a similar holding.
Here, the debtor presented the attorney with four post-dated checks
in satisfaction of pre-petition legal fees.' 36 In his defense, the bank-
128. In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114, 117 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
129. Id. at 116.
130. Id. Filing a bankruptcy petition automatically stays a creditor's attempt to collect a pre-
petition debt from the debtor; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
131. In re Symes, 174 B.R. at 116; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing that the automatic
stay provision prohibits any act by a creditor to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose prior to filing for bankruptcy until lifted by the court in accordance vith 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)).
132. In re Symes, 174 B.R. at 116.
133. Id. at 118.
134. Id. at 119 CUnless section 523 dictates otherwise, every pre[.]petition debt becomes dis-
charged under section 727.").
135. In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 130 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998).
136. Id. at 126.
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ruptcy attorney argued that the post-dated checks represented non-
dischargeable post-petition debts because payment of the filing fee
was a condition precedent to the payment of legal fees.137 This con-
dition, the attorney claimed, was not satisfied until after filing of
the bankruptcy petition; hence, the claim arose post-petition and
was non-dischargeable. 13 8 The court ultimately disagreed, 139 bol-
stering its own holding with those of other courts. 140 It found that
although the debtor paid all his legal fees after filing the petition,
the fees owed for pre-petition services were dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy.141
As evidenced in the caselaw, post-dated checks used to sat-
isfy pre-petition legal expenses constitute dischargeable debt sub-
ject to the automatic stay provision (unless the debtor secures court
approval for a reaffirmation). 142 This essentially makes the legality
of post-dated checks subject to the implementation of valid reaf-
firmation agreements, which themselves present significant prob-
lems for bankruptcy attorneys seeking guaranteed payment for pre-
petition legal expenses. Consequently, the success of this type of fee
agreement is anything but guaranteed.
2. Installment Agreements
As with post-dated checks, judicial acceptance of installment
agreements is far from widespread. In 1997, the Ninth Circuit an-
nounced its opposition to such agreements in In re Biggar.43 Here,
the debtor and the attorney agreed to a fee arrangement that es-
tablished monthly installment payments for pre-petition legal
137. Id. at 128.
138. Id. at 128-29.
139. Id. at 129.
140. Id. at 130 (citing In re Hines, 147 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
automatic stay provision applied to the debtor's attorney's attempts to collect fees he earned pro-
petition, under a pre-petition fee agreement)); In re Hessinger & Assoc., 192 B.R. 211, 216-18
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a pre-petition agreement to make post-petition installment
payments for pre-petition legal work is dischargeable); In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114, 119 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1994) (holding that pre-petition fee agreements requiring debtors to execute post-dated
checks to be cashed post-petition constituted a dischargeable claim subject to the automatic stay
provision).
141. In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. at 130.
142. Post-dated checks can be enforceable if legally reaffirmed and judicially approved. In re
Syrnes, 174 B.R. at 119.
143. Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Tr. (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 688 (9th Cir.
1997).
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services.' T The installments were to be paid f llowing the filing of
the Chapter 7 petition.145 The trustee for the estate moved for a re-
view of the fees, and the court of appeals held that pre-petition le-
gal debts, to be paid in installments post-petition, are discharge-
able. 14 The attorney for the debtor asserted that the discharge
147
and disclosure' 48 provisions conflicted because there is no logical
purpose behind post-petition review of dischargeable fees.149 The
court insisted, however, that the disclosure and discharge provi-
sions could coexist. 50 To begin, the court noted that § 523 and § 727
do not explicitly exempt pre-petition attorney's fees from
discharge. 151 Therefore, the court concluded, if these fees are to be
exempt from discharge, statutory authority must be found else-
where. 52 The court then addressed the disclosure rules0 3 imple-
mented in accordance with § 329.154 It noted that if such rules ap-
plied only to Chapter 7 cases, there would, indeed, be a conflict of
Code provisions. 55 The court determined, however, that these pro-
visions also apply to Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases, in which fee
agreements for pre-petition and post-petition legal fees are typically
aspects of the debtors' plans for which court approval must be se-
cured.156 Because § 329 and the disclosure rules have such broad
applicability, the court concluded that they must be construed to
govern more than simply pre-petition fee arrangements entered
into for Chapter 7 cases. 157 Therefore, while the dischargeability of
a Chapter 7 pre-petition fee agreement renders its review moot,
§ 329(b)'s cancellation provision is still relevant to Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 plans because pre-petition attorney's fees under those
plans are still reviewable and subject to cancellation.'I s In so dis-
missing the attorney's claim of conflict, the court ultimately dis-
144. In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 686.
145. Id. at 686.
146. Id. at 688.
147. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994).
149. In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 688.
150. Id. CThus, while the disclosure provisions contemplate examination of post.petition
payments to the debtor's attorney, those provisions can be reconciled with the discharge provi-
sions.") (citing In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996)).
151. Id. at 687.
152. Id. at 687-88.
153. See supra note 12 (quoting Bankruptcy Rules 2016 and 2017, the "disclosure rules").
154. In re Biggar, 110 F.3d at 687-88.
155. Id.





charged the installment agreement based on § 523's failure to ex-
empt pre-petition attorneys' fees from discharge. 159
In In re Martin, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado sided with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Biggar.160 In that
case, the debtor and his bankruptcy attorney entered into a fee ar-
rangement involving a pre-petition filing fee and a flat post-petition
fee payable in installments. 161 The trustee filed an application for
review of attorney's fees, arguing that the attorney's disclosure of
the fee arrangement was inadequate, that the fee agreement was
dischargeable, and that it created an "impermissible conflict of in-
terest" between the debtor and his attorney.162 The attorney re-
sponded that she had adequately disclosed the fee arrangement,
that the arrangement was not dischargeable, that the debtor had
entered into the executory contract freely, and that § 329 only per-
mits the discharge of excessive fees. 163 Although the court found
each party's arguments persuasive, it ultimately cancelled the fee
agreement. 64 The court based its decision on the fact that § 727(b)
does not exempt pre-petition attorney's fees from discharge; it rea-
soned that, had Congress wished to create an exemption for pre-
petition legal fees, it very easily could have done so.165 In addition,
the court found that an impermissible conflict of interest arose be-
tween the debtor and the attorney. 166 Although it is permissible and
quite common for a client to pay his legal fees over time, the court
criticized fee arrangements in which the bankruptcy attorney si-
multaneously plays the roles of counselor and creditor. 167
Contrary to Biggar and Martin, In re Perez approved the use
of installment agreements, subject to certain stipulations. 68 Prior
to filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtors and their attorney
executed a promissory note obligating the debtors to make ten in-
stallment payments to cover the attorney's fees. 169 The debtors and
the attorney then entered into a reaffirmation agreement since the
parties had executed the installment agreement pre-petition. 170
159. Id.
160. In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
161. Id. at 123-24.
162. Id. at 124.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 129-30.
165. Id. at 127.
166. Id. at 129.
167. Id.
168. In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319, 321 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
169. Id. at 320.
170. Id.
1690 [Vol. 54:4:1665
BANKRUPTCY, JUSTFOR THE RICH?
When challenged by the trustee for the estate, the bankruptcy
judge replied that he "support[ed] and encourage[d] the use of in-
stallment fee agreements for bankruptcy services," noting that the
Code permits such arrangements. 171 The court was careful to state
that such installment agreements executed pre-petition will only
have legal effect if the parties enter into a reaffirmation agreement
which complies with the disclosure procedures set forth in § 524(c)
of the Code. 7
2
The Perez judge's claim that the Code encourages install-
ment arrangements is somewhat misleading because the Code does
not specifically allow installment arrangements. Rather, it permits
a debtor to reaffirm an installment contract for pre-petition legal
fees because an installment contract is a pre-petition debt that
would otherwise be discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.7 3
Thus, the Code allows reaffirmation-not installment contracts.
Absent reaffirmation, and unless the installment contract pertains
to matters specifically exempt from discharge, the contract will be
discharged in bankruptcy. 7 4 Most importantly, one must remember
that even if the installment contract is reaffirmed, the Code grants
the debtor sixty days to rescind that reaffirmation.175 Installment
contracts are therefore viable only if reaffirmed and not rescinded.
Obviously, this situation does not provide the financial security a
debtor's attorney would like to have prior to agreeing to represent a
debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding.
3. Skeletal Cases
Skeletal cases, as previously noted,17 6 are those in which the
attorney performs the least amount of work necessary in order to
file for bankruptcy without prejudice to the debtor. 77 The idea is to
perform nearly all bankruptcy services post-petition so that the fees
generated for such work will not be discharged in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Unfortunately for attorneys relying on this type of fee
arrangement, current caselaw cautions against the practice.
171. Id. at 321.
172. Id. at 321-22.
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) (1994).
174. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 524(c)-(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
176. See supra Part H.B.3.
177. See, e.g., In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 442-43 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (referring to these
types of cases as "deficient").
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In re Haynes serves as a typical example of judicial opposi-
tion to skeletal filings. 178 In Haynes, the debtor's attorney entered
into an agreement with the debtor to file a skeletal bankruptcy pe-
tition; after filing, the attorney would complete the work for a flat
rate of $600.00.179 The attorney chose this arrangement to circum-
vent a previous holding that fee agreements involving flat fees to be
paid, post-petition, in monthly installments create a dischargeable
debt. 180 Unfortunately for the attorney in Haynes, her argument
was insufficient to overcome precedent' 81 and earn court approval.
The court recognized the attorney's good intentions, stating that it
had no problem approving flat fees.182 Problems arise, however,
when flat fees are attributable, even in part, to pre-petition work.183
The court refused to endorse this skeletal filing method, asserting
that such arrangements are really pre-petition agreements calling
for post-petition installment payments. 84 These arrangements not
only create a dischargeable pre-petition debt, but they also create a
conflict of interest between the debtor and the attorney, ultimately
requiring cancellation of the fee agreement. 18
5
C. Pre-Petition Security Interests
Security interests, though widely accepted in most personal
transactions, raise eyebrows when utilized in the legal profession.
The concern stems from the ethical implications of attorneys simul-
taneously assuming the two seemingly inconsistent roles of coun-
selor and creditor. 8 6 The misgivings are especially pronounced in
the case of bankruptcy attorneys. Once a bankruptcy attorney ac-
cepts a security interest in her client's property as payment, she
becomes a creditor indistinguishable from those adverse to her cli-
ent. 187 The attorney now has an independent financial interest in
the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings; consequently, she "may
be tempted to consider not only the best interests of [her] client but
also the probable impact on [her] own fees and [the] likelihood of
178. Id.
179. Id. at 442.
180. Id. at 441-42 (citing the holding in In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996)).
181. See id. (citing In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996)).
182. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. at 443-44.
183. Id. at 443.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., In re Martin, 197 B.R. at 128-29.
187. See, e.g., id. at 129.
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payment" when deciding how to handle the case.18s As one bank-
ruptcy court noted, "where the creditor is the debtor's own attorney,
the conflict of interest involved is obvious. How can the lawyer ad-
vise the debtor fully and effectively where the lawyer himself or
herself is on the other side of the bargaining table from the cli-
ent?"'8 9 Despite these concerns, courts generally uphold security
interests in the form of promissory notes executed in favor of the
bankruptcy attorney for his pre-petition legal fees. 90 Problems
arise in one of two situations: (1) when an attorney becomes a credi-
tor by accepting a security interest prior to and wholly unrelated to
the bankruptcy proceeding,19' or (2) when a bankruptcy attorney
attempts to extend a security interest taken in a non-bankruptcy
matter to the bankruptcy matter. 92
In re Leitner exemplifies the general judicial approval of
bankruptcy attorneys taking security interests in exempt property
to secure their pre-petition fees. 193 In this case, the debtors gave
their bankruptcy attorney a promissory note for $1,275, payable in
monthly installments and secured by a mortgage on their home. 19
The debtors initially reaffirmed their obligation to pay counsel, but
then sought to rescind the agreement. 195 The court initially noted
that a bankruptcy attorney is not automatically disqualified from
representing a debtor simply because she holds a security interest
for legal services rendered pre-petition1 96 To avoid disqualification,
though, the security interest must be disclosed by counsel in the
Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) statement,' 97 and by debtors in their
bankruptcy schedule. 198 Thus, while approving of security interests
as a valid means of securing payment for pre-petition legal services,
the Leitner court acknowledged the limitations of such an endorse-
188. See Quittner, supra note 126, at 447.
189. In re Frazier, 231 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (quoting In re Hines, 147 F.3d
1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998)).
190. See, e.g., In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998). If. however, security in-
terests are taken in property deemed to be exempt under Section 522(o, those interests vll
likely be avoidable. "Section 522(0 protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his
fresh start by permitting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property." HR. REP. NO. 595, at
362 (1977).
191. See, e.g., In re Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174, 1176-77 (8th Cir. 1993).
192. See, e.g., In re Mahendra, 131 F.3d 750, 755-57 (8th Cir. 1997).
193. In re Leitner, 221 B.R. at 502.
194. Id. at 503.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 504.
197. See supra note 12 (quoting Bankruptcy Rule 2016).
198. Caher, supra note 23; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016 (addressing compensation for services
rendered and reimbursement of expenses); supra note 12 (quoting Bankruptcy Rule 2016).
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ment. 199 Unless debtors reaffirm their obligation to pay counsel, the
obligation will be discharged in bankruptcy proceedings as pre-
petition debt.20 0 Unlike this personal obligation, however, the court
concluded that the mortgage would pass through bankruptcy unim-
paired because it was fully secured and may be enforced against the
debtor's estate after the automatic stay provisions terminate. 20 1
Therefore, although the debtors would have no further personal ob-
ligation to their attorney, the attorney would be free to enforce the
mortgage and collect from the debtor's estate.
20 2
As one would expect, there are exceptions to the general ju-
dicial approval of paying attorneys with security interests. At least
two cases have held that a security interest creates a conflict of in-
terest between the debtor and the attorney, thus disqualifying the
attorney from further representation.
203
In In re Mahendra, the debtor gave his attorney a promis-
sory note for advances up to $35,000.00 and secured the note with a
lien on his property. 20 4 The debtor had originally sought legal assis-
tance in defending against criminal proceedings brought by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, and he executed the note in consideration
thereof.20 5 Two months after entering into the security agreement,
the attorney filed a Chapter 7 petition on behalf of the debtor.206
The court found that, as of the date of the bankruptcy filing, the
attorney was a pre-petition creditor whose security interest was
limited to the value of his pre-petition, tax-related legal services.
207
Thus, as soon as the attorney sought to provide the debtor with
bankruptcy representation, a conflict arose.208 The court not only
held that the attorney had created a conflict of interest by at-
199. In re Leitner, 221 B.R. at 505.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 505-06. In order to pass through bankruptcy unimpaired, the court noted that a
debt must be fully secured, not "avoidable as a preference or fraudulent conveyance," and not
avoidable under "[s]ection [522](f) which can be used to avoid certain non-purchase money secu-
rity interests ...." Id. Moreover, bankruptcy counsel must wait to enforce her claim until the
bankruptcy court has lifted the automatic stay under § 362. Id.
202. Id. at 506; CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANxRUPrCY 540 (1997) C'[A] bank-
ruptcy discharge does not destroy the in rem rights of the lien holder, which instead passes
through bankruptcy unaffected; the discharge only eliminates the debtor's in personam liabil-
ity.").
203. See In re Mahendra, 131 F.3d 750, 759 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Ragar, 3 F.3d. 1174, 1176
(8th Cir. 1993).
204. In re Mahendra, 131 F.3d at 759.
205. Id. at 753.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 759.
208. Id. at 756.
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tempting to apply the lien to the bankruptcy-related services, but it
went so far as to sanction the attorney under Rule 9011(a)20 9 for his
inappropriate conduct.
210
The bankruptcy court in In re Ragar heard a case with facts
comparable to Mahendra and reached a similar conclusion. 211 The
court held that the attorney had a conflict of interest because he
had a pre-petition claim for non-bankruptcy related legal fees, in-
cluding a security interest in the debtor's property. 21 Because the
attorney was a creditor of the debtor, and because he held a secu-
rity interest in the debtor's property that was wholly unrelated to a
subsequent bankruptcy filing, the court disqualified the attorney
from representing the debtor in the bankruptcy action.213
Despite the potential for conflict, most courts approve of
bankruptcy attorneys taking a pre-petition security interest in their
clients' property.2 14 For example, in addressing conflict of interest
concerns, the court in In re Leitner pointed out that attorneys and
clients are almost always in a creditor-debtor relationship: "[Tihe
fact that a client is indebted to counsel for undisputed charges for
services rendered within the scope of the current representation
does not provide an ethical or statutory basis for disqualification of
counsel."21 5 Typically, disqualification due to an unacceptable con-
flict of interest results only when the attorney is found to be a pre-
petition creditor with respect to non-bankruptcy related matters.
If courts enforce security interests as compensation for
bankruptcy legal services, why are such interests an inadequate
solution to the problem of finding a guaranteed fee arrangement?
The answer lies not in the character of the fee arrangement, but in
209. Id. at 758. Rule 9011(a) gave courts the authority to sanction attorneys for submitting
bankruptcy petitions to the court, detailing information not grounded in fact or good faith beliefs.
See id. at 758-59 (quoting the rule in part). Bankruptcy Rule 9011 was amended on April 11,
1997, with the amendments becoming effective on December 1, 1997. See id. at 758 n.9. Because
the sanction orders in this case arose prior to the effective date, the court determined that the
amendments to 9011 did not have implications in the case. See id.
210. See id. at 759 ("The established standard for imposing sanctions is an objective determi-
nation of whether a party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances .... Snyder's
[counsel's] assertion that his lien extended to other matters was not supported by the law or a
good faith argument for its modification or reversal .... It is appropriate to deny or reduce com-
pensation to a professional that represents a party (here, Snyder represented himself as a credi-
tor of Debtor) who has an interest adverse to the bankruptcy estate.").
211. In re Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir. 1993).
212. Id. at 1176. The attorney previously represented the debtor in various non-bankruptcy
matters for which the debtor transferred some property to the attorney to secure legal fees. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 502 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998); In re Rogor 3 F.3d at
1174; In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319, 319 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
215. In re Leitner, 221 B.R. at 504.
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the condition of those debtors from whom the attorney seeks to ex-
tract such an agreement. A debtor filing a no-asset Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy petition by definition has few, if any, assets. 216 Although
most courts would likely approve of the use of a security interest to
guarantee a note for pre-petition legal fees, it is highly unlikely
that the debtor will own outright any property valuable enough to
pledge as security. 217 Worse yet, consumer no-asset proceedings
comprise the majority of all bankruptcy proceedings filed.218 Thus,
while security interest fee arrangements garner judicial approval,
they are unlikely to be of much use to an attorney handling a con-
sumer no-asset Chapter 7 proceeding.
D. Credit Cards
The United States economy is largely based on consumer
debt, and no one knows that better than the credit-reliant con-
sumer.219 Last year alone, Americans charged over $1 trillion on
their credit cards.220 Although the consumer regularly uses credit
cards to pay for everything from groceries to doctor's bills, using
them to pay for legal fees is a relatively new development. Credit
card payment for pre-petition bankruptcy fees has yet to secure
widespread judicial approval, and according to some courts, it may
even constitute fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A).
1. Judicial Disparity
In re Frazier is one of two cases specifically addressing the
use of credit cards in bankruptcy proceedings. In this case, the law-
216. BAIRD, supra note 32, at 13.
217. See id. (noting that in most "no assee' Chapter 7 cases there is nothing to be divided
amongst the creditors and no assets significant enough to be the subject of litigation);
BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that normally there will be no assets available for the
trustee to distribute).
218. See Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1999-2000, per Quarter, available at
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1990nonbuschapter.html (last visited March 28, 2001) (showing
that nearly 70% of all bankruptcy filings for the year 2000 were filed under Chapter 7); see also
BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at 111.
219. JASPER, supra note 1, Introduction (noting that the American economy is largely based
on consumer debt). "There is a virtually unlimited supply of goods and services, and credit is
readily available to those who do not have the cash on hand to make such purchases. The temp-
tation to live beyond one's means is often difficult to resist." Id.
220. See Nightline: Drowning in Debt (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 14, 2001). Perhaps
even more staggering is the fact that the average credit card balance was more than $4,000 this
year, representing a 100% increase over the last 10 years. Id.
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yer told the debtor she could charge a bankruptcy fee of $1,750.00
to a credit union credit card provided she intended to reaffirm that
debt.221 For undisclosed reasons, the debtor did not reaffirm the
debt, and the credit union filed a dischargeability proceeding for the
credit card debt and the other debts it was owed.2 The trustee
sought an order requiring the attorney to return a portion of his
allegedly excessive fee and to pay the costs of defending the debtors
against the credit union.22 The court concluded that the attorney's
compensation was reasonable and that, because the attorney was
not responsible for the debtor's failure to reaffirm, he should not be
held accountable for the legal fees incurred by the debtors in de-
fense of the pending non-dischargeability action.224 While not spe-
cifically approving of the use of credit cards to pay a bankruptcy
attorney's pre-petition legal fees, the absence of judicial condemna-
tion in Frazier seemingly represents a tacit endorsement of the
practice. 2
25
Citibank v. Meeks reached a very different conclusion,
deeming the use of a credit card to pay a bankruptcy attorney's pre-
petition fees to be fraudulent and holding the credit card debt non-
dischargeable. 226  In this case, Citibank brought a non-
dischargeability claim based on the allegation that the debtors used
their Citibank credit card to obtain a $5,000 cash advance just six
weeks prior to filing bankruptcy.227 Even worse, just seven days af-
ter obtaining the cash advance, the debtor consulted with his attor-
ney about filing bankruptcy; later, he paid the attorney $770.00
from the advance. 228 The court held that a cash advance obtained by
a debtor at a time when he knew or should have known that he
would be unable to repay the debt is non-dischargeable on the
grounds of fraud.229
221. In re Frazier, 231 B.1. 454, 455 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999); Caher, supra note 23.
222. In re Frazier, 231 B.R. at 456-57.
223. Id. at 457.
224. Id. at 458; Caher, supra note 23.
225. See Caher, supra note 23.
226. Citibank (South Dakota) v. Meeks (In re Meeks), 139 B.R. 559, 561 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1992).
227. Id. at 560.
228. Id. at 561.
229. Id. at 559.
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2. Potential for Fraud
Divergent court opinions are not the only basis for rejecting
the credit card fee arrangement; more importantly, perhaps, ac-
cepting payment by credit card or advising a client to take a cash
advance to pay bankruptcy attorney fees is intuitively offensive,
and it borders on fraud.230 If a debtor visits a bankruptcy attorney
shortly after obtaining a cash advance, a court would likely infer
that the debtor knew or should have known that he would be un-
able to repay the recently incurred credit card debt-hence his rea-
son for visiting a bankruptcy attorney in the first place. In this
situation, the court would likely declare the credit card debt to be
non-dischargeable. 238 Consequently, it is inadvisable to suggest to a
client that it is acceptable to use his credit card near the date of his
bankruptcy filing. Even if the suggestion is conditioned upon a
promise by the client to reaffirm the debt, he can always refuse to
do so, or later rescind; the attorney then would come uncomfortably
close to being implicated in a fraudulent scheme. 232 In addition, if
the creditor contests the discharge on grounds of fraudulent debtor
intent, the bankruptcy attorney could be forced to become a witness
against his own client, which again could implicate his client and/or
himself in the perpetration of a fraud.238 Clearly, then, bankruptcy
attorneys should not feel at all confident in relying upon credit card
fee arrangements to ensure payment of pre-petition legal fees.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN EXEMPTION: A CALL TO AMEND § 523
This Note has demonstrated the difficulties associated with
securing payment for pre-petition legal services in a no-asset Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy proceeding when the debtor is unable to pay for
such services up front and in full. The plain language of § 329 ap-
pears to advocate a discharge exemption for pre-petition bank-
ruptcy attorney's fees; yet § 523 refrains from specifically including
pre-petition attorney's fees in the list of debts exempted from § 727
230. See Caher, supra note 23; In re Meeks, 139 B.R. at 561 (holding that a cash advance ob-
tained by a debtor at a time he knows or should know that he is unable to repay the debt is non-
dischargeable on grounds of fraud).
231. Caher, supra note 23 C'In most cases, attorney fees will be only a part of a larger obliga-
tion owed to a creditor, and the fact that the debtor charged his or her bankruptcy fees might
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discharge. 2 4 Absent specific instructions in the Code that pre-
petition attorney's fees should be exempt from discharge, courts
generally characterize such debts as dischargeable. 2 5 This has
forced bankruptcy attorneys handling consumer no-asset Chapter 7
claims to resort to a variety of fee arrangements in order to sidestep
discharge.2 36 Unfortunately, the most popular fee arrangements
have proven largely inadequate, and they are often illegal. This
Note proposes a solution that will reduce litigation in this area
while encouraging attorney representation of the poorest of debtors:
Congress must amend § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code to exempt un-
paid, pre-petition bankruptcy attorney's fees from discharge.
A. Judicial Deference to Congress
As this Note demonstrates, many courts have confronted the
issue of whether a bankruptcy attorney's pre-petition legal fees can,
or should, be discharged in a no-asset Chapter 7 proceeding. Al-
though several of these courts believe that there are important
public policy justifications for exempting pre-petition fees from dis-
charge, they also recognize that their decisions must comply with
statutory constraints.2 3 Most significantly, they believe that they
are bound to follow the plain language of the Code, which does not
explicitly include pre-petition legal fees in the list of those debts
exempt from discharge under § 523.2 8 Thus, many courts have
called upon Congress to fashion a legislative remedy to adequately
address the no-asset Chapter 7 attorney's dilemma.2 9
234. See 11 U.S.C §§ 523, 727 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
235. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 20-21.
237. See, e.g., Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Tr. (In re Biggar), 185 B.R. 825, 829
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ('IThere are legitimate and important public policy concerns in this dispute.
No one wishes that indigent debtors are denied counsel because they lack a re-
tainer... however... public policy concerns cannot trump the plain language of the bankruptcy
code."); see also In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) ('This court may not
agree on a philosophical basis with the results mandated by the Bankruptcy Code. . .[b]ut this
Court is bound to apply the law as Congress has written it."); In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) ("Though I agree... that there are legitimate and important public policy
concerns about access to the banlruptcy system for indigent debtors ... public policy concerns
cannot trump the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code.").
238. See, e.g., In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000) (stating that because
the statute is so clear, a request to exempt pre.petition legal fees from discharge should be made
to Congress and not the courts).
239. See, e.g., In re Hines, 147 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998) (C[T'he optimum solution to
the problem would call for action by Congress...."); Hessinger & Assocs. v. Voglia (In re Voglio),
191 B.R. 420, 426 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996).
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Congress should take action where the judiciary has repeat-
edly recognized a problem that only Congress can remedy. 240 In fact,
this is a problem that Congress, itself, created. 41 Amending § 523
to include unpaid pre-petition bankruptcy attorneys' fees in the list
of exemptions is a practical and appropriate solution. The amount
of money at stake in litigation of this sort may be small, but the
implications are large, pervading each of the many thousands of
Chapter 7 bankruptcies reaching the federal court system each
year. 242 Amending the Code to provide an express exemption to dis-
charge for unpaid, pre-petition bankruptcy attorney's fees would
address judicial concerns, end litigation of this issue, and redirect
attorneys' attention towards their clients' best interests and away
from their ability to pay.
B. Ensuring Access to the Bankruptcy System
While bankruptcy attorneys wish to earn a good living from
fees paid by their clients, their clients want good advice and repre-
sentation for a reasonable fee. 243 Under the current Bankruptcy
Code, however, this ideal could not be further from the grasp of the
indigent debtor who is unable to advance the costs of pre-petition
legal fees. 244 In the absence of a provision excluding pre-petition
attorney fees from discharge, bankruptcy attorneys are discouraged
from representing debtors who are too poor to pay the costs of pre-
petition legal services in advance. 245 Because none of the popular
fee arrangements providing for payment of pre-petition legal fees
are guaranteed to escape discharge, many indigent debtors are pre-
240. See In reHines, 147 F.3d at 1190; In re Voglio, 191 B.R. at 426 (urging Congress to pro-
vide a remedy for the problems surrounding the payment of pre-petition attorneys' fees).
241. In re Hines, 147 F.3d at 1189 (noting the absence of express statutory treatment of at-
torneys' fees and that Congress has failed to correct its oversight); In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 498
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) ("Congress has failed to set out explicit rules regarding the treatment of
attorneys fees in Chapter 7 cases.").
242. See In re Hines, 147 F.3d at 1186.
243. See Braucher, supra note 46, at 165.
244. See, e.g., In re PASCO, 220 B.R. 119, 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (noting that the current
state of the caselaw prevents a Chapter 7 debtor from waiting to pay pre-petition attorney fees
until post-petition). This, in turn, effectively precludes debtors from filing bankruptcy absent an
initial payment for services. Id. Serious implications arise as a result, including "limiting indi.
gent debtors' access to bankruptcy relief and, perhaps, increasing the number of pro se bank-
ruptcy debtors." Id.
245. See supra note 23; In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000) ('This court
fully recognizes that debtors ... who cannot afford to pay attorney's fees before filing for bank-
ruptcy may have difficulty in obtaining legal counsel.").
[Vol. 54:4:16651700
BANKRUPTCY, JUST FOR THE RICH?
cluded from seeking the advice of bankruptcy counsel and accessing
the remedies provided by the system.246
Critics have cited the rise in the number of Chapter 7 filings
as evidence of adequate access to the bankruptcy system.24 7 In addi-
tion, these critics have also challenged others to cite statistics in
support of a contrary position.248 Yet, the rise in the number of
bankruptcy filings suggests nothing other than the fact that more
and more people currently find it difficult to deal with the financial
burdens of a credit-based economy.24 9 Moreover, the call for statis-
tics supporting a contrary conclusion is a futile one. There is no way
to accurately determine exactly how many debtors have been, and
continue to be, discouraged from utlizing the bankruptcy system
due to an inability to afford a bankruptcy attorney. One cannot
compile statistics on what debtors might have done; one can only
compile statistics on what debtors actually did.
Critics also suggest that equal access to legal counsel is rela-
tively inconsequential given the existence of alternatives such as
debt counseling 250 or "do-it-yourself' bankruptcy kits.2' Although
these alternatives may provide important bankruptcy information,
their efficacy presumes a level of debtor competence that may not,
in fact, exist. Theoretically, every debtor has access to the bank-
ruptcy system because anyone can file pro se. Yet, the ability to file
bankruptcy means nothing if the debtor's ignorance precludes him
from maximizing the strategic advantages available under the
bankruptcy rules.
Allowing the bankruptcy system to continue to function in its
current state is counter-productive. The structure of the current
system deprives the neediest debtors of significant remedies.
Amending § 523 of the Code to exempt unpaid, pre-petition bank-
ruptcy attorney's fees would enhance indigent debtors' ability to
access the aid of an attorney, thereby ensuring equal access to the
bankruptcy system. 2 2 It would effectively remove attorneys' disin-
centives to represent extremely poor debtors by allowing these
debtors to pay the pre-petition costs of their case post-petition, with
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 7, at 604.
248. Id.
249. See supra note 220.
250. Lander, supra note 28, at 174-84.
251. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 7, at 604.
252. See In re Perry, 225 B.it 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
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no concern for discharge.2 3 Most importantly, it would open the
bankruptcy system to all debtors; even the most indigent debtor
would theoretically have access to a bankruptcy attorney because
he would not be forced to pay pre-petition legal expenses in ad-
vance.
At least two courts have suggested that providing indigent
debtors with access to the remedies of the bankruptcy system is not
the only relevant public policy concern. 254 These courts note that
there is an equally compelling public interest in providing an hon-
est debtor with a fresh financial start;255 this, they believe, pre-
cludes the creation of an exception to discharge for pre-petition at-
torney fees. 25 6 While the perpetuation of debt undoubtedly inhibits
a true "fresh start," debtors are certainly no better off pro se. What
these courts fail to acknowledge is that indigent debtors are un-
likely to reap maximum benefits from their "fresh start" without
the assistance of a bankruptcy attorney. It is unlikely that these
debtors have the ability to decipher the complexities of the bank-
ruptcy system on their own. 257 Instead, they need effective profes-
sional assistance in order to make informed choices, based on their
unique circumstances and concerns, so they can obtain adequate
and appropriate relief.
258
C. Relieving the Tension Between the Attorney's Interests and Those
of the Client
As the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states: "Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system, and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright
253. See Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Tr. (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 685-87 (9th
Cir. 1997) (declining to address the attorney's policy argument that the availability of fee ar-
rangements calling for post-petition payment of pre-petition legal fees allows debtors access to
legal counsel from whom they would otherwise be effectively barred).
254. Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Tr. (In re Biggar), 185 B.R. 825, 829 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
255. Id.
256. JASPER, supra note 1, at 1 CBankruptcy is designed to give an individual a 'fresh start'
by discharging, i.e., canceling, certain debts.").
257. BUCHBINDER, supra note 1, at Preface (exemplifying the complexities of Bankruptcy law
by stating that his primary intent in writing his book was as a "basic primer for attorneys .... to
demystify bankruptcy law and practice for non-bankruptcy attorneys").
258. Lander, supra note 28, at 163.
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person while earning a satisfactory living."259 The ethical dilemmas
facing an attorney representing a consumer no-asset Chapter 7
debtor are no exception.260 If attorneys are to make a living, secur-
ing paying clients becomes a primary goal.
261
Recognition of an attorney's self-interest in securing paying
clients is particularly important when a debtor lacks sufficient
funds to pay a pre-petition retainer.262 The attorney would like the
business, but typically she will not take the case unless she can find
a way to secure payment of her fees. In some cases, self interest
even compels the attorney to advise debtors to file Chapter 1326 or
other high percentage payment plans when Chapter 7 would actu-
ally better serve the debtor.264 Until Congress adds pre-petition
debtor's attorney's fees to the existing list of exemptions from dis-
charge, this conflict of interest will continue to surface, unduly in-
fluencing bankruptcy recommendations made to debtors.
V. CONCLUSION
A primary goal of the bankruptcy system is to respond to the
financial pressures facing the neediest debtors. In its current state,
259. Preamble to ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUcT 8 (1995); see Braucher, supra note
46, at 172.
260. See Braucher, supra note 46, at 172; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Con-
flicts of Interest, 1 AL BANIUR INSr. L REV. 287, 296 (1993); see generally DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT. WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974) (addressing attorney-client conflicts
of interest).
261. Braucher, supra note 46, at 172.
262. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 444-45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
263. JASPER, supra note 1, at 80 (defining Chapter 13 as the section of the Bankruptcy Code
applicable to regular income debtors and involving the reorganization of their financial affairs).
As a general rule, pre-petition attorney fees in Chapter 13 do not have to be paid up front This
decreases the attorney's anxiety over securing a pre-petition retainer. Braucher, supra note 46,
at 175. If the debtor cannot meet the obligations set forth in his Chapter 13 payment plan, the
attorney is free to discontinue her services; in other words, attorneys are not forced to work
without compensation in a typical Chapter 13 situation. Id. Furthermore, Chapter 13 legal
services are typically offered on an "easy credit" basis, "requiring little or nothing down, with the
attorney's fees rolled into one monthly payment to the trustee, often made by payroll deduction.
This makes it easier to sell Chapter 13 immediately and at a higher price to the debtor." Id.
Thus, while the Chapter 13 option opens the doors of bankruptcy to debtors who cannot pay a
retainer for pre-petition fees, it is not necessarily the most appropriate option or the best means
of serving the debtors' financial interests.
264. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. at 444-45 (noting that the court has heard many bankruptcy at-
torneys admit that they filed Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7, where Chapter 7 would have
better served the debtor, solely because of debtors! lack of funds to pay their attorney fees); see
also In re Leitner, 221 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998) CThe selection of the appropriate
bankruptcy chapter should not be influenced by the need to pay attorney fees."); Braucher, supra
note 46, at 174 ('A lawyer's self-interest sometimes dictates not only using Chapter 13, but also
putting clients into high percentage plans.").
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however, the Code has a radically different effect: it precludes these
debtors from accessing the system. Amending § 523 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to allow post-petition payment of pre-petition legal fees
would foster a more open, more egalitarian bankruptcy system.
Guaranteeing payment of attorneys' pre-petition legal expenses
would open the bankruptcy system to all debtors-not just those
able to advance a pre-petition retainer. This would provide each
debtor with an equal opportunity to seek the advice of counsel and,
ultimately, to receive an effective and beneficial fresh start.
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